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ABSTRACT
Interconnected Precarity: A Contemporary Reframing of Bodily and
Earthly Health in Wendell Berry’s The Unsettling
of America: Culture and Agriculture
Abigail Pinegar
Department of Comparative Arts and Letters, BYU
Master of Arts
Published in 1977, Wendell Berry’s book The Unsettling of America: Culture and
Agriculture gained widespread popularity. More than half a century later, many of the notions of
the body and the earth presented in its seventh chapter, “The Body and the Earth,” remain
relevant and important for environmental discourse today. Berry’s discussion of the body and the
earth examines their mutuality and codependence from an ontological, theological, agricultural,
and even biological perspective. The coupling of this text with Judith Butler’s, Frames of War:
When is Life Grievable? contemporizes his argument through its more socio-political and
philosophical claims regarding life and the body. Through the discussion of societal frames that
often prescribe the value of life and bodies, Butler introduces the concept of precarity, or the
imposition of violence and its resultant instability of the body. Driven by the external forces of
society, precarity weakens, commodifies, and exploits the body, creating unsustainable social
systems. As we learn from Berry, this bodily precarity parallels the violence and mistreatment of
the earth. The body, and its ecological and anthropological interconnectedness, establishes both
material and immaterial ties to the earth, suggesting that any damage done to the body affects not
just itself, but the entire system.
In bringing together Butler and Berry through an ecocritical dialogue, a new ethic
regarding the formation and meaning of a life emerges, prompting revision of the current societal
parameters that establish the definitions of the body and the earth. Berry’s resurgent relevance
comes from his admonitions to repair the relationships of all bodies and the networks of which
they are a part. Thus, the connection between an individual and their body, other bodies, and the
earth must be restored for an environmental ethic to both persist and establish productive
environmental change.

Keywords: ecocriticism, Wendell Berry, body, precarity, earth, Judith Butler, environmental
discourse
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Introduction
In 1854, Henry David Thoreau published the first copy of Walden, a poetic tribute of his
exploratory stay in a small cabin at Walden Pond, Massachusetts. The book details his
experience with the surrounding forest, the solitude of silent work, and the engaging contrasts of
life embedded in nature. While the legitimacy of Thoreau’s two-year stint at the cabin has since
been questioned upon speculation regarding his degree of seclusion and frequent visits to the
home of his parents, Walden served as the pillar of transcendental literature. Heavily influenced
by romanticism and the teachings of Kant, transcendentalism developed in the northeastern
United States from a group of Neoplatonists primarily concerned with idealism and the search
for “an original relation to the universe” (Emerson 3). As a central founder of the movement,
Thoreau, and his counterpart Emerson, found the solace of undisturbed landscapes to be a critical
element within which to analyze the ideals of the world. His romantic opus, and the homage it
paid to the surrounding nature, secured its fixture within the movement and inspired many nature
writers well beyond its original publication.
Often regarded as the contemporary Thoreau, Wendell Berry, a farmer, poet,
environmental activist, and writer shared similar idealist opinions of the simplicity and
spirituality of convivial participation with nature (Peters 1). Berry’s humble agricultural life and
his passionate expressions of its accompanying communion with land within his writing affords
ample opportunity for comparison to Thoreau. Both men valued nature and engaged politically,
participating in an “enduring strain of Thoreauvian civil disobedience” of their own form and
providing critical evaluations of politics that appear to value economy over all else (2). However,
such comparisons often sequester his writings to relevance only within a certain era and neglect
fundamental differences between the two writers. While the parallels between Thoreau and Berry
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cannot go unacknowledged, it is unfair to hold Berry to a more naïve romanticism captured by
Thoreau. Thoreau found a spiritual connection to the land to come from a life of seclusion and
independence in wilderness, differing from the quiet, but active pastoralism of Berry.
Furthermore, Berry’s commentary on the destruction of environmental impact he so vehemently
detests substantiates his undeniable presence within modern ecological thought and literature.
While Thoreau concerned himself with individual communion with nature, Berry seeks a more
widespread dynamic of environmental thinking that only just begins with the local and
eventually translates to a broader land ethic with which we can view the world. However, his
consistent associations with the likes of Thoreau and Emerson, as well as his strong sense of
place, resulted in his association with more idealized perspectives of nature. Over time, Berry’s
significance within environmental discourse began to wane, ultimately emphasizing “that [his]
influence in this country is really limited” (Lane 94). His lack of influence may also indicate his
tendency to be confused and often misevaluated by readers, where his “strident moralism” and
non-partisan politics afford him “little influence with today’s conservation organizations”
(Freyfogle 189). Not only do his political affirmations lack popularity, but they have frequently
placed him in direct contradiction with the popular beliefs of an era; at the peak of some of his
most radical environmental writings advocating for local, agricultural, anti-capitalist thought, the
decades that followed brought the economics of Reagan and an exodus from the rural to
capitalist, metropolitan meccas (Britton-Purdy). To some, he is too strict and unrelenting in his
moralistic assertions, while to others, he lacks distinction because of his nonadherence to one
political camp.
However, the consistent resurfacing of environmental themes within his writing does
classify him as an ecocritic. Ecocriticism, the defining term of environmental discourse, was not
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coined until 1978 by William Rueckert in his essay “Literature and Ecology: An Experiment in
Ecocriticism,” one year following the 1977 publication of Berry’s The Unsettling of America:
Culture and Agriculture. Ecocriticism developed from literary ecology, and broadly describes
the study of “the global ecological crisis through the intersection of literature, culture, and the
physical environment” (Gladwin). At the time of Rueckert and Berry’s publications, the
ecocritical movement began to expand, including more interdisciplinarity than the romantic
literature from which it stemmed. Berry’s poetry, fiction, and nonfiction heavily featured
environmental themes and explorations of nature, creation, and agriculture, but more importantly
they also reinvigorated the relationship between humans and the environment in ways that were
previously unexplored. Such unifying connections between humans and nature, or the “process
of rediscovering human connections to the land,” was later termed bioregionalism, a concept
Paul Lindholdt attributes to exploration by Berry himself (“Literary” 122). Berry’s rootedness in
his desire to refamiliarize humans with nature not only establishes his place in the historical
context of ecocriticism, but also provides a legitimate foundation for his connection to
contemporary environmental discussions. Despite his similarities with the transcendentalists and
the seeming complexity of his politics, Berry’s work deserves further consideration for its
ongoing relevance within more contemporary ecocriticism.
This thesis aims to elucidate the necessary revisitation of Berry’s work, specifically his
book The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture, through a more modern lens and with
the aid of additional literature, highlighting his interpretation of topics that would continue to
permeate environmental discourse even decades later. In his essay and the seventh chapter of The
Unsettling of America, “The Body and the Earth,” Berry determines the body to be the origin of
earthly concern through their parallelisms and codependence. For Berry, the body and the earth
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are both theological and agricultural in formation and subsistence. Berry’s discussion of the body
examines notions of its ontological formation, physical boundaries, and persistence of life. While
this work engages with such themes, it requires a coupling with modern interpretation and
supplementation by other writers grappling with similar topics.
One such pairing of Berry’s “The Body and the Earth” is with Judith Butler’s text,
Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? While perhaps seemingly unrelated, the two provoke
similar questions regarding the body and its capacity for life. While Butler gained prominence
through their 1 studies in gender, queer theory, and philosophical literary theory, they frequently
address the societal treatment and conception of life and bodies within their work. Thus, Butler’s
text offers a more political and philosophical counterpart to that of Berry’s ontological
descriptions of life. This thesis demonstrates that when these two perspectives are brought
together in more sympathetic dialogue, we see a new ethic with which we can interpret the
formation and meaning of a life, prompting revision of the current societal parameters
establishing definitions of the living, human body. In doing so, the notions and definitions of a
body expand to include that of the earth as a body, re-engaging its treatment as a life much like
our own, and therefore re-imagining the interconnectedness of all life within the earthly system.
These two works highlight a seemingly overlooked comparison between the treatment of
the human body as reflective of the treatment of the earth, and furthermore, what poor conduct
towards these bodies means for the health and persistence of earth’s systems. Though critics of
Berry challenged the broader applicability of his beliefs, I intend to address the contemporary
significance of his work, “The Body and the Earth,” through the lens of Judith Butler, whose
socio-political description of bodies both challenges and echoes elements of Berry’s. Through
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Judith Butler’s preferred pronouns are they/them and will be used in this thesis.
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the discussion of “frames,” Butler introduces the concept of precarity, indicating the distinct
instability of the human body. Precarity, driven by the external forces of society, weakens the
body, creating unsustainable social systems. As we learn from Berry, this bodily precarity
parallels the violence and mistreatment of the earth. The body, and its ecological and
anthropological interconnectedness, establishes both material and immaterial ties to the earth,
suggesting that any damage done to the body affects not just itself, but the entire system. Thus,
Berry’s resurgent relevance comes from his admonitions to repair the relationships of all bodies
and the networks of which they are a part. The connection between an individual and their body,
other bodies, and the earth must be restored for an environmental ethic to both persist and
establish productive environmental change. Without such reparation, any attempts towards
earthly compassion will likely lack success.
Together, the unlikely pairing of Berry and Butler allows for a more holistic exploration
of the body’s defining characteristics, neither of which would be sufficient on their own. Instead,
revisiting Berry with the accompaniment of Butler’s frames further emphasizes that these
conversations of earthly care, ethical treatment, and violence still permeate our society and
require resolution. Additionally, Berry’s incorporation of spirituality emboldens forgotten
elements of the body that Butler’s argument appears to lack, reviving the applicability of religion
and spirituality to environmental discourse despite its diminished popularity and exclusion in
more recent years. Though coming from entirely different frameworks and perspective, the
coupling of these two works highlights their mutual conclusion: that the body’s differential
exposure to precarity only results in its ultimate destruction. The breadth and differences of
Berry and Butler’s perspectives initiate a broader interpretation of the body and the earth that

5

have not previously been connected, providing new opportunities to reevaluate the ethical
implications of environmental care.

Berry and His Critics
The basis of Berry’s environmental concern likely stems from his upbringing on a farm in
Kentucky. In direct contrast to the growing urbanism of the late 20th century, Wendell Berry
eventually returned to his familial and agricultural roots in the rural area of Henry County. His
work as a farmer greatly influenced his writing, celebrating the work and efforts of the agrarian
lifestyle in his poetry and his prose. His humble mode of living also fostered his distaste for
technology, frequently issuing harsh criticism of its modernization, automation, and
environmental degradation. Farming practices involving heavy machinery, mass production, and
monocrops are, according to Berry, at the root of exploitation and exhaustion of land (Unsettling
53). Furthermore, the use of machinery meant less direct interaction between the farmer and the
physical land, separating them from their work and the purpose behind it. In doing so,
industrialization divided farmers from the kind of care and respect more traditional forms of
agriculture required, and instead fostered apathy towards the land and an interest in the capitalist
performance of their production. In response, he preached a more literal “hands-on” method—
one requiring sustainable, human care for the land itself. His work as an activist, both
environmentally and politically, largely drew upon his own experiences as a farmer, a writer, and
a Christian. Indeed, these aspects of his life inspired his discussion of land, and more
particularly, the wrong that American consumer society was doing to it. Despite this criticism,
many believe Berry to be a “true” American through his epic defenses of “actual American soil”
(Peters 4). He endeavors to not only live a life in defense of the earth, but also educate others to
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do the same through his fiction, poetry, and essays. Education, democracy, hard work, and
fidelity feature heavily within his works, enlivening his adamancy that all are required for a
sustainable economy.
Indeed, Berry’s moral and religious assertions reflect a deep complexity within his work
and beliefs. Despite identifying as a Christian, his works draw inspiration from other traditions as
well—such as Buddhism—evoking spirituality rather than simply the religious cannon of
Christianity (Berry, “Christianity”). Similarly, his political beliefs do not consign him to either
side of the polarizing party territories. While he declares himself “Jeffersonian” in his desire to
minimize government involvement and magnitude, he also feels that the government ought to
“protect small business and craftsmen” from allowing the “ravages of the ‘free’ market” to lead
those already benefiting from such an economy from becoming “richer and stronger” (Berry,
Unsettling 8). Therefore, his politics are less concerned with labels than they are with freedom,
participatory citizenship, and the protection of land. To Berry, the “fundamental business of any
political community” is to “preserve the land and culture on which it depends” (Smith 50). Thus,
the only method for a sustainable country is through the preservation of both its land and its
people.
Despite the ecological prescience he exhibits in this work, Berry’s views are often
oversimplified, purporting him to be concerned only with local politics, environment, and
community. His assertions appeared to lack global application, and with the ushering in of
popular post-structural considerations, Berry’s importance diminished in the wake of the
thematic globalism of contemporary environmental discourse. His perceived naïveté and
association with writers like Thoreau and Emerson cast him as too romantic for the
environmental cosmopolitanism of post-structuralists, such as Ursula Heise. In Sense of Place,
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Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the Global, Heise describes a cosmopolitan
environmentalism facilitated by images of the earth through new forms of technology. She
claims that such images and technological advancement allow society to engage in global issues
in ways that influence them personally, rather than solely focusing on the local experience. This
global perspective provides a greater sense of connectedness through shared commonality of
being a global citizen rather than one belonging to an insular locale. Thus, “sense of place” was
no longer a representation of local “territorial” nostalgia, but rather a globalized one that respects
differences as part of a diverse, interconnected earth system (Heise 50).
Heise’s critique of Berry primarily centers around her perception of his embeddedness
within local environmental concerns. His concern for local—or generally American and
Western—issues indicated a limited perspective, one too individualized to consider their larger
applicability within a global system. Indeed, Heise reiterates that Berry advocates for local
management of environmental problems, as globalism tends to be unmanageable to the extent
that these issues “cannot be solved” (Berry, “Words” 198). However, the movement from local
to global rejects the current political and economic state of our world, intertwining nations
beyond simply that of their shared humanity. Heise pointedly indicates Berry’s notions of “sense
of place” as singularly local and anachronistic, and that instead, the globalization of modern
society requires an updated perspective that should include both local and global concerns.
Additionally, Heise takes note that Berry’s more regionalized concerns reflect a parochial
view indicative of his privilege. Berry is indeed white, male, and middle class, individualizing
his perspective to that particular lens. While perhaps unintentional, this perspective often leads to
the neglect of diverse groups of individuals who differ in description and experience. Those in
lower socio-economic classes, minorities, the uneducated, the disenfranchised, and the
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metropolitan dwellers will likely never have the opportunity nor the means to develop their own
land or sense of place through Berry’s proposed method of working land. Indeed, Berry’s
agrarian lifestyle ideal and criticism of metropolitanism disregards the inaccessibility and
financial infeasibility it presents for a large majority of the population. With such a staunch
commitment to localized “sense of place,” his Jeffersonian pastoralism appears to alienate
anyone outside of that description, making a more global and widespread approach to
environmental issues seem as impossible as Berry suggests. Therefore, Heise believes Berry’s
rootedness is more cultural than ecological because it discounts the possibility of her claims that
nomadic or metropolitan behavior can provide an inclusive, globalized sense of place, or, as she
argues, an aptly termed “sense of planet.” To Heise, Berry represents a previous, outmoded camp
of localized environmental thought, while she develops the next era of ecocriticism as one of
global concern for the environment.
However, what Heise fails to consider are some of the larger applications of Berry’s
assertions about earthly connectedness within The Unsettling of America. She extrapolates
passages from other works and broadly applies them as archetypes of the era during which Berry
was most prolifically writing. His idealized pastoral lifestyle, complaints about technology, and
disdain for metropolitan living could easily cast him as too traditional, short-sighted, and perhaps
out of touch with a globalized consideration of the environment. Indeed, she isolates his
perspective by prescribing it as wholly local and misses a fundamental element at the core of his
environmental ethos. For Berry, Christian creation theology provides the basis for the
connectedness of all things on earth, it connects all earthly beings to the “fertility of the world, to
farming and the care of animals. It brings us into the dance that holds the community together”
(“Sex” 133). His perspective, though perhaps actively concerned with the immediacy of the local
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and heavily informed by his Christian beliefs, applies holistically to the earth and its function as
a global community. His writings are perhaps more moral than traditionally Christian, and they
provide a basis upon which one can source their own ethics regarding environmental harm and
violence. Regardless of religious affiliation, his works drive individuals to evaluate their place in
a connective network larger than themselves, as he does with the several introductory questions
to his essay, “The Body and the Earth,” asking “what connections or responsibilities do we
maintain between our bodies and the earth?” (Berry, Unsettling 97). These questions prompt
individual reflection of the significance of the body’s relationship to the earth—something all
individuals on earth experience whether consciously or unconsciously. Indeed, in his work,
Citizenship Papers, he insists upon the importance of seeing “the world as a community of all
the creatures, a community which, to be possessed by any, must be shared by all” (Berry 8). He
does not discount the necessity and importance of global consciousness, but rather believes the
inverse of Heise’s notion, that for one to be a good global citizen, they must proactively engage
locally first.
Heise, and others like Sheldon Wolin, criticize Berry’s assertion that a community is “by
definition, placed” (Berry, Home 192). Indeed, they suggest his narrow, idealist agrarianism
excludes marginalized groups, including people of color, the disenfranchised, refugees,
nomads—even metropolitan dwellers and women—whose experience of placelessness is often
by circumstance and not by choice. Others, like Joseph Wiebe, highlight claims that his fiction
advocates unrealistic morals and idealistic communities, suggesting that their “imagined
condition indicates that they are outside of history, and therefore isolated from reality and
experience,” they contribute “nothing in and of themselves to present reality and experience”
(Wiebe 4). Additionally, his agricultural Jeffersonianism reflects his perhaps unintended, but ill-
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informed commitment to a sort of new-world pastoral, neglecting the historical neo-colonialism
that occurred with the expulsion of millions of indigenous American tribes from what eventually
became farmland. However, while his “sense of place” provides a somewhat problematic,
limited, and prescriptive method for earthly care and ethics, Heise and others’ dismissal of him
as a localist, elitist, and romantic of a colonial, bygone environmental era not only
overgeneralizes his arguments but also overlooks the similarities his writing and ideas have to
their own. While he is not necessarily considered a post-colonialist, he is also not permissive of
inequality and colonialized approaches to land, and certainly condemned the mistreatment of any
individuals, regardless of their perceived place in society. In discussing the colonial history of
America, Berry wrote: “what they saw” when they arrived to the “New World was a new
sovereignty of the human mind…a great concentration of ‘natural resources.’ …That some of
those resources were human beings mattered not at all. …They arrived contemptuous of
whatever existed before their own coming, disdainful beyond contempt of native creatures or
values or orders” (Unsettling 54-55). Berry did not only condemn the exploitative practices of
earthly violence but also injustices enacted upon other humans, suggesting that he, like postcolonial and ecocritical writers, was not entirely unaware of these problematic practices and
narratives.
Indeed, the very use of the word “unsettling” in his title implies its own dismantling of
colonialized thought. To “settle” insinuates a claim to land as one’s own—an individualized right
to its use as they desire. Colonialization follows much of the same pattern through “geographical
violence” where “virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought
under control” (Said 77). In reference to Said’s assertions, Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George
Handley elaborate on the inextricability of land from historical colonial narratives. The
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reclamation of landscapes in a postcolonial ecology requires both history and nature, implying
the necessity of a local sense of place for writers such as Edward Said, Pablo Neruda, Martin
Carter, and other critics of colonialism (DeLoughrey and Handley 4). While global ethics and
their application are important, these postcolonial writings echo a similar perspective that
“engaging the local and often inassimilable aspects of culture and history help to uphold a sense
of alterity while still engaging a global imaginary” (28). Both postcolonialists and Berry find it
imperative to begin on a local scale to formulate an adequate discourse of place and its ecology,
as well as the potential history of violence that cannot be discounted from its narrative. By
historicizing nature on a local level, it allows for the variability of historical narratives without
discounting them through a generalized, global perspective, allowing for both local and global
interests to coexist. While Berry’s writing is not entirely devoid of colonialized perspectives
given his practice of pastoralism and Jeffersonian ties, he raises critical questions regarding the
ethical implications of enacting violence upon bodies—both land and human. Berry’s criticism
of the violent exploitation of these bodies and resources, as well as his underscoring of the local,
reflects what Heise fails to recognize both in his writing and her own: a concern for global care
rooted foremost in place.
Berry is not without his own limitations, and yet his contributions to conceptions of the
body and its inherent connections to the earth extend beyond the traditional romantic
transcendentalism of Thoreau’s 19th century and the environmentalism of the late 1960s. Indeed,
Berry’s consideration of the earth and the interconnectedness of its systems as critical to human
survival as well as social and ecological sustainability indicates his awareness of crucial, ongoing
themes within environmental discourse. His discussion of human engagement with biological
processes “explores numerous routes to sustainability—that is routes to sustain both agriculture
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and human culture” (129). Therefore, the characterization of Berry as a local-obsessed “luddite”
is as narrow-minded as his critics accuse him of being (Wickenden). Through a more benevolent
reading of his work, one could see his primary concern is to “live meaningfully and
constructively,” restoring the “broken connection” between the earth and the body “that is
potentially catastrophic” (Slovic 261; Wickenden).
The conception of the body in “The Body and the Earth” takes a rapid, but distinct
departure from the predominant agricultural focus of the other chapters in The Unsettling of
America. Although his exploration of the body resurfaces in his later works of fiction, nonfiction,
and poetry alike, his early discussion of it here provides ample introduction to the effects
imposed when the body, like agriculture and the earth, experiences threats from persistent
societal destruction. The book itself came during a time when the agricultural situation was,
according to Berry in his second edition preface, “not good,” and has “grown worse since the
book was written” (Unsettling xi [2015]). In essence, the book came “out of a belief that we were
living under the rule of an ideology that was destroying our land, our communities, and our
culture—as we still are,” and although at times “vehemently disagreed with, has never been
answered, let alone disproved” (229). Berry’s featuring of not just agriculture but also the body
in a book determined to expose the destructive practices of our modern economic approach
suggests the body’s prominence as both a fixture of the earth’s destruction and the path towards
greater sustainability.

The Body
This interconnective and social relation of the body informs Butler and Berry’s
definitions of the body. Their conceptions of bodies also rely heavily on the defining elements of
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the material body and its social valuation. However, Berry’s understanding of the body stems
from its ontological formation through a Christian theological interpretation of creation, while
Butler’s depends upon secular philosophy stemming from its social and political context. Despite
this, both believe bodies to be fundamental elements necessary to an identity of responsibility
and communal consciousness. Indeed, both also present the ways in which the body can often be
misconstrued, misvalued, denigrated, and exploited by societal perceptions. The body is a
necessary agent in establishing a physical connection to the networks of community that appear
to be at risk, connecting one to others through tangible means of existence and actionable
response. Through this interpretation, the secular and religious perspectives coincide in their
acknowledgment of the material connectivity of the body and their mutual desire for its
persistence.
Butler’s definition of life begins with a deconstruction of the very way it has been
determined by society. A “being” is ontologically formed through its exposure and formation by
“social crafting,” or in other words, “the body is exposed to socially and politically articulated
forces as well as to claims of sociality—including language, work, and desire—that make
possible the body’s persisting and flourishing” (Butler 3). The body is dependent upon the forces
that surround it and act upon it, therefore rendering it subject to their power and determinations.
An individual body is not independent from other bodies because of its position within this
socially postured system. In this regard, the system functions negatively to arbitrate the meaning
of a life to certain beings and not others, excluding or including them in a determination for what
it means to be a life. These social parameters of “intelligibility” or “recognizability” are what
characterizes societal “apprehension” of a life as a life (6, 7). Not unlike Butler, Berry believes
society’s warped understanding of life stems from its isolated position within the Creation. While
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creation here refers exclusively to a religious term of God’s formation of life, Berry also uses it
to refer to the social and biological systems of which he believes all lives, not just those deemed
intelligible or recognizable, are a part. Such systems may be communities, religious
congregations, cities, voting boundaries, ecological systems, family units, agricultural
beneficiaries, and more. Thus, Berry’s determination begins with the narrative of Christian
theological creation as found in religious scripture, including creation of all life, not just human.
Second, he extends the Creation to include systems both biological and communal, extending its
parameters to include entire systems, rather than individual creations themselves. Similarly, but
agnostically, Butler determines that we are also “social beings from the start, dependent on what
is outside ourselves, on others, on institutions, and on sustained and sustainable environments,
and so are, in this sense, precarious” (23). Bodily precarity is distinctly intertwined with the
notion that we are beings that exist in relation to and with dependence on other beings and forms
of life. Therefore, Berry claims that “the body cannot be whole alone. Persons cannot be whole
alone. … Intellectually, we know that these patterns of interdependence exist … yet modern
social and cultural patterns contradict them and make it difficult or impossible to honor them in
practice” (Berry, Unsettling 107). The narrow frames currently present in society that Butler
highlights as determining life are the limitations imposed on individuals that prevent their full
engagement with the social and biological interdependence connecting them to other life. Both
Berry and Butler describe the inherent interactions that exist between individuals and among the
members of a system, established through social and biological networks. This foundation also
exposes the threats to the success of these networks that hegemonic powers present when they
establish limited, differential definitions of bodies.
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Berry chooses to define the body through its theological ontology in Christian tradition.
In doing so, he establishes that there is a fundamental issue with the way humans understand,
interact with, and use their body, noting a dramatic shift away from its inseparable connection to
the earth. Bodies, he asserts, “are part of the creation,” but they are “also agricultural, for no
matter how urban our life, our bodies live by farming” (Berry, Unsettling 101). Therefore, his
conception of bodies lies within a Christian ontology in which an omniscient God shaped and
constructed both the earth and human bodies. However, in his understanding of Creation, he
takes a notable departure from some other commonly held Christian perspectives that human
creation occurs on the sixth of the seven-day Creation in which they are literally constructed “in
God’s own image” (New International Version, Gen 1:27). Instead, Berry reads the Book of
Job’s Creation account as one of bounty and mystery, in which “humanity is only a part of it—
not its equal, much less its master” (Berry, Unsettling 102). Berry literalizes that God formed
humans from the dust of the earth by asserting that “our bodies are moving particles of the earth,
joined inextricably both to the soil and to the bodies of other living creatures” (Gen 2:7; Berry,
Unsettling 101). Humans therefore consist of earthly matter created prior to their own formation
in God’s image, establishing a harmonious balance between the celestial and the natural through
its leveling of the human to the degree of an earthly being. Unfortunately, a steady shift in
attitudes created an imbalance amongst these beliefs, and humans began anthropocentrically
emphasizing the importance of their bodies too much or degrading them to the point of
objectification and lack of use, resulting in an essential loss of their identity.
Some believe Christian interpretation of the body afforded the misinterpretation of the
body and its mis-valuation in mortality. The creative origin of the body and its archetype, God
himself, incite a powerful metaphor for the significance of humanity. Though God created
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humans on the same days as other animals, he instructs humans towards a divine role of
dominion over these animals (Gen 1:26). Frequent interpretation of this particular part of
scripture focuses on dominion as power, establishing a hierarchical structure in which humans
rise above their animal and earthly counterparts, forgetting that even the “dust too is a creature of
the Creator” (Berry “Christianity”). In doing so, they have established a dualism and separation
between their mutually divine createdness. The human, therefore, has been elevated to a status of
highest importance, compromising other forms of creation to prioritize their own persistence
through the justification of their supposed appointment from God. While much criticism of this
perspective exists, Lynn White’s 1967 article, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,”
most famously prescribes the direct effect of such a perspective on the environment. White
suggests that the Western Christian idea of environmental domination yielded environmental
dualism, or the separation of human and nature, insisting that “it is God’s will that man exploit
nature for his proper ends” (1205). His assertion that “Christianity is the most anthropocentric
religion in the world” reinforces this notion of exploitation of the earth, in that he believes, much
like Berry, that industrial development and machine technology exacerbate the objectification of
the earth by Western culture (1205). These advancements make permissible the widening of this
dualism between human and nature.
Despite his criticism of Christian anthropocentrism, White ultimately advocates for
Christian theology’s unique position to drive environmental change, a perspective Berry adopts
and attempts to resolve in his own work. Thus, the dualism White introduces in his article plays
an important role in the discussion of the body for Berry. At the beginning of “The Body and the
Earth,” Berry describes various Chinese landscape paintings he has observed. The images do not
solely feature vast, undisturbed scenes of wilderness, but they also include human figures.
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Fascinated by this inclusion of humanity, he describes that these images feature “a world in
which humans belong, but which does not belong to humans in any tidy economic sense; the
Creation provides a place for humans, but it is greater than humanity and within it even great
men are small” (Berry, Unsettling 98). Here, Berry introduces many of the same ideas White
addresses within his article, while simultaneously allowing for a more forgiving interpretation of
Christian Creation theology. While White attributes full responsibility for the upheaval of
animism and spirituality to Christianity, Berry seamlessly marries the two. He acknowledges that
through art, the eastern perspective condemns an economically motivated inclusion of human
presence and allows for a Christian conception of Creation that dissolves the dualism between
the two. Much like these paintings suggest, he believes the two belong together, humbly
representing humanity’s presence in the Creation, but not denying its value either. Indeed,
humanity’s inclusion in such a landscape suggests to both Berry and the viewers an intentionality
in doing so. Berry, therefore, describes their representation in these images as indicative of their
participation in landscape rather than their division from it. By including the human body
amongst other creation, he provides a more equitable valuation of the body in that it too stands
amongst even the grandeur of landscape while maintaining humility through its comparative
scale.
White’s analysis that Christianity encouraged the conflation of the body’s divine creation
with that of great power and status is not unwarranted, but his interpretations introduce and
exacerbate a dualistic perspective. Unlike other Christian interpretations, however, Berry does
not succumb to notions of dualism. Instead, Berry determines it to be the central problematic
element driving both our human and ecological crisis. He concludes that dualism extends from a
loss in the ethics found in Christian theology, attributing its source to the economic desire that
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eventually permeated society. Like White, however, Berry still believes Christianity to be a
valuable source for the reconciliation between humans and their environment. Berry cushions his
perspective with a more ecological Christian interpretation. He presents an argument that
includes Christianity as a possible solution rather than solely focusing on its participation in the
problem. By separating religious notions from the secular, harmful dualisms only widen. Instead,
Berry calls for the reunification of the body through greater recognition of its materiality and
spirituality—both of which exist independent from religion and provide the critical element of
life: significance (“Christianity”). While Berry is still critical of Christian dualism and exposes it
for the damaging effects of division it ultimately produced, he also suggests a reinterpretation of
Christian theology would indicate its condemnation of separation of “these two supposed-to-be
‘parts’” (“Christianity”). This dualism between humanity and environment can also be
understood through Berry’s description of dualism within the self. Much like the human’s
dissociation from the environment, so too has their internal identity been divided.
While Berry’s primary argument establishes the importance of restoring the body’s
balance within ecological, sociological, and spiritual contexts, his definition of “body” primarily
rests in its ontological formation in Creation and again, functioning predominantly to provide
explanation for its origin rather than a description of what defines it. His focus on the body’s
original formation, rather than a clear, distinct definition of the body itself leaves room for its
broader interpretations. He does, however, provide a clearer intimation into what the body
appears to be lacking when defined by other authors. For Berry, the body is not singularly the
corporeal physicality of life; while it requires a physical element as means of its existence, it
cannot be what he considers “whole” without its intangible counterpart: the spirit (Unsettling
107). Therefore, the body consists of both the material elements of biologically “moving
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particles,” and immaterial elements, like that of the mind, soul, or spirit (101). Berry
substantiates this assertion, quoting William Blake’s famous claim that “Man has no Body
distinct from his soul” (107). The body cannot exist in completeness without the intelligible,
incorporeal element of the spirit. Likewise, the spirit also cannot exist without the material body,
another issue Berry encounters with religious preoccupation. According to Berry, “the formula
for man-making” is not “man = body + soul,” but rather that from the dust of the earth and the
breath of God, the human “became a soul” or a “whole creature” (“Christianity”). Again, this
could uniquely appeal beyond a religious audience because he acknowledges the necessity of
both the material and immaterial requirements of the body. Unlike Berry, some Christians tend to
elevate the spirit, resulting in a problematic assumption of its role within identity, laying waste to
the body as an object tainted by earthly sin. For them, the body simply functions as a vessel for
the spirit until its ascension to Heaven. This competition between spirit and mind directly
resulted in their inevitable imbalance. When the two components of the body that Berry so
clearly asserts make a whole body are at odds with one another, it offsets the cultural and
religious valuations of them, disrupting their function within the biological and social networks
of which they are a part.

The Immaterial Self: Spirit
Indeed, this is the context in which Berry frames his argument, that the body formulated
through Creation requires both physical aspects of the earth from this creation, as well as the
impalpable incorporation of something beyond the body. The corporeal body ties itself to the
physical earth through their mutual elements, but through Berry’s determination, the body also
consists of the transcendental spirit, linking it to God and heaven. Despite this framing of the
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body and spirit within a religious context, his definition remains relevant to secular audiences
with similar concerns. By bolstering Berry’s own notions of the body that appeal to the secular,
such as its biological relation, the applicability of his argument is no longer singularly
theological, but also functional within secular contexts concerned with molecular and cellular
function. Similarly, focusing on Berry’s conceptualization of the body allows for the
identification of what his definition lacks and how this affects his argument’s viability.
Nevertheless, in his exclusion of a clearly defined body (in the corporeal sense), he does not say
what cannot be defined as the body, widening the terms by which a body can be identified. Such
inclusion allows for greater opportunity to connect the body to other sources of life or immaterial
elements of it, furthering his argument of the connection between the earth and the body.
Berry’s criticism of duality necessitates a firm understanding of the immaterial element
that makes up the remainder of the individual’s identity. The counterpart to the physical
rendering of the body resides in his definition of the “soul,” a necessary requirement for mortal
completeness. Although Berry’s references to the soul begin almost immediately within his
essay, he does not begin to define it until well into his argument. He first parenthetically cites the
soul as synonymous with the “mind or spirit,” giving it both sacred and secular distinctions.
Later he associates the soul with identity, suggesting that it is the “immaterial part of one’s being
– also known as the psyche, soul, spirit, self, mind, etc.” (Berry, Unsettling 115). Berry utilizes
these words interchangeably throughout the essay, frequently referring to the spirit, the soul, and
the mind as this immaterial, intangible aspect of one’s identity. His synonymous use of mind,
soul, and spirit here recalls Hegel’s Geist, a referential term for the non-corporeal, intellectual
element of a person, that recognizes itself as in and part of the world (Hegel 383). Hegel’s
positioning of the spirit as Geist represents human consciousness present not just within the
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bounds of Christian theology, as it is “the hallmark of a theory of self identity—a theory in
which I am something other than a person” (Solomon 642). Furthermore, Geist is not singularly
applicable as a piece of an individual identity alone, but it establishes one’s significance beyond
their physicality and relation to others. Hegel’s notion of Geist also recalls Butler’s discussion of
“others,” whom we recognize through the determination of our self as a being. Thus, Geist is a
“sort of general consciousness, a single ‘mind’ common to all men” (Solomon 642). It allows for
humanity to see themselves as beings themselves, but also in relation to others through a shared
human consciousness, furthering Berry’s assertion of shared human connectivity through both
spirit and body. 2
In identifying the spirit as a key element of human identity and as the self-conscious
counterpart to the body, Hegel’s determination offers reinforcement to an agnostic understanding
of spirit. Berry, in loosely defining spirit as mind, soul, self, or psyche allows for a broader, more
secular interpretation. For Berry, the necessity to define the spirit is less crucial than
understanding its connection to the body and the detriment of their separation. Similarly, Hegel’s
interpretation of spirit “represents an ambitious attempt to resolve certain far-reaching
epistemological problems, characterized as the ‘disharmony between subject and object’”
(Solomon 643). Like Hegel, Berry’s notion of the unification of spirit and body centers around
the problematic treatment of the body as object through an abstraction of the spirit from it. A
removal of the spirit from the body, or rather “to think of the body as separate from the soul or as
soulless…is to make an object of it. As a thing, the body is denied any dimension or rightful
There are, however, criticisms of this shared consciousness that Solomon raises as well. He claims that Geist is
“universal only in that it is the name of those properties had by every human consciousness: it is not universal in the
sense that it is the name of a single entity (mind) common to every individual” (Solomon 644). In this case, it tends
to forget or offer little importance or concern for the mind of the individual itself (644). Here, we use the term to
indicate the former. While Hegel is not the absolute or only theorist distinguishing the self from other, he offers an
interpretation that elucidates the more secular elements of Berry’s definition of spirit, making it more applicable to
less religious interpretations and continued applicability in contemporary discourses of the body.
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presence or claim in the mind” (Berry, Unsettling 117). Thus, severe detachment of the spirit
from bodily functions denies the body of respect through its constant objectification. Without a
soul, the mistreatment of that object becomes greater, as it no longer houses the other requisite
for determining identity and life—a fundamental concern of both Berry and Butler.

Dualism and the Self
Berry attributes the issues of earthly mistreatment to the separation of body and spirit and
their mistaken synonymity with “object” and “subject,” which stemmed from a widespread
adoption of René Descartes’s notion of dualism. Descartes, a French mathematician,
philosopher, and scientist during the Age of Enlightenment, echoed the sentiments of the time, in
which science and intellect were heavily explored and praised. During a critical era of
technological advances and exploration, these new developments set a precedent of bodily disuse
that would continue to permeate society for hundreds of years. Descartes’s Discourse on Method
ushered in the changing sentiments that science and reason were more valuable than blind
religious orthodoxy. Cartesian dualism reflected the attitude of the era, emphasizing that
“corporeal events might have an impact on processes of thinking, but the final product—thought
‘itself’, with its concomitant relations of meaning—was to be valued precisely insofar as it was
disembodied” (Fraser and Greco 6). Therefore, Cartesian dualism introduced the body not as a
living organism with capacity for self-aware consciousness, but rather a machine. His famous
adage, “Cogito ergo sum,” or “I think, therefore I am,” negates the necessity of a physical body
as integral to human existence (Descartes 51). The body is of no inherent value to Descartes,
other than to operate and control the machinations of his mind. He upholds that the “‘I’ is a
substance that has no need of a body, and that this ‘thinking thing’ is, in fact, his essence”
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(Collier 140). He is only what he can discern from thought, and therefore, his existence is not
contingent upon the requirement of a body. His assertions about the mind, or that immaterial
“thinking thing,” denigrate the body, objectifying it by deeming it unnecessary except for
conducting the business of the mind. Thus, the mind was inevitably misconstrued as the totality
of an individual and the body the unthinking object in which it is carried. Cartesian dualism
resulted in the ultimate derogation of the body and its use as a machine object, providing
repeated opportunity for the prioritization of the mind over the body and ample ammunition with
which to mistreat it.
Furthermore, widespread ubiquity of Cartesian dualism can still be found in
contemporary accounts of social science, explaining its permeation through society and
engraining within social consciousness (Fraser 6). This dualistic mode of interpreting the body
and mind separates them entirely, distinguishing one as the “body-object” that is “other to the
subject of knowledge” (7). By determining the body to be the unfeeling counterpart to the
cognizant “subject”, the body becomes an easily commodified object which the mind simply
uses. This idea of the body as “other” to knowledge is the very distinction Berry warns will lead
to the body’s “counterpart economy of its own, based also on the law of competition, in which it
devalues and exploits the spirit. These two economies maintain themselves at each other’s
expense” (Berry, Unsettling 109). Therefore, when the physical aspect of the body is set as
“other” to the spirit or what is deemed the subjective element of a human, the body as a whole—
as Berry would describe it—loses its connectivity to the earth and fellow bodies. Indeed, if the
spirit or mind becomes the only subjective aspect of the body, then everything counter to the
mind becomes an object. All perceived physical bodies are suddenly the “other” to the more
important “subject of knowledge,” at risk of becoming the economic value of an object: capital.
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Thus, in a society where intelligent thought provides the basis for a hierarchical valuation, those
without education or intelligence can easily be deemed “lesser than.” Once again, this
problematic machination of the body worsens when the body is presumed to lack subjectivity
and it is therefore subordinate to the actions of others whose “minds” are deemed superior. Such
determinations dangerously produce systems of differentiation between individuals and groups
of people, a result of the frames of “relation” Butler describes (Butler 7). Thus, individuals’ lives
range in valuation from worthy to worthless, determining that they are therefore “differentially
exposed to injury, violence, and death” based on their proposed societal worth (25). This is the
basis of precarity, in which certain lives are “not ‘regarded’ as potentially grievable, and hence
valuable” (25). The inequities of belief surrounding intellectual thought amplify Butler’s
dissatisfaction with the socio-political framing of bodies and the implications for precarity they
establish.

Butler’s Frames, The Notion of Life, and Precarity
While Berry does not explicitly utilize Butler’s term of precarity, he employs similar
ethos in his discussion of the body through its constant exposure to damage and violence. Berry
establishes that the fundamental threat to the body is its isolation, which can occur through
various forms, but is most often a result of the body’s degradation. When it is devalued, the body
“sets up a counterpoint economy of its own, in which it devalues and exploits the spirit. These
two economies maintain themselves at each other’s expense” and the body is given “a value that
is destructive of every other value” (Berry Unsettling 105, 104). Therefore, an isolated, marred,
and denigrated body not only results in complications for that individual, but also presents
threats to the system of which it is a part. It is impossible for a damaged body to exist peacefully
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within a system of violence. Violence towards oneself or another instigates a cycle of violence
through the devaluation of all other bodies, suggesting Berry’s precursive perspective of bodily
precarity and the dangers established through its enaction.
Understanding Butler’s notions of frames, life, and precarity is critical to the connection
between Berry and Butler. In Frames of War, Butler examines the parameters, or what they term
as “frames,” for establishing the definition of a life, and more specifically, a precarious life.
Butler evaluates the powers and structures that establish these frames for determination of life,
wherein Butler claims social and political understanding generally arbitrates the boundaries of
personhood, the protection of life, and the societal value of a life. Like Berry, Butler engages
with the problematic prescriptions of the bodily valuations assigned by societal formulations.
Thus, Butler’s developed exposition of precarity relies heavily on understanding the framing of
the body, or rather a body. Butler refers to this process as “apprehending” a life, or the process
by which the “capacity to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being produced
according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed as part of life” (Butler 3). Butler asserts that
“to be a body is to be exposed to social crafting and form,” where “the body is exposed to
socially and politically articulated forces as well as to claims of sociality…that make possible the
body’s persisting and flourishing” (3). However, prohibiting the flourishing of a body could
determine its demise by way of injury and violence established by the societal and political
frames of normative ontological structures. To simplify their claim: social, political, and external
beliefs and perspectives establish norms to which we measure the standards of a body. Anything
existing within those norms is more likely to experience stability and success, and even to avoid
violence or injury, whereas any body perceived to be outside these norms cannot be guaranteed
shelter from violence or mistreatment.
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The current frames of normativity establish that certain lives and bodies fall outside of
these conditions, rendering them vulnerable to mistreatment. These norms and their boundaries
exclude certain groups or individuals because they are not deemed worthy of protection, or even
the title of a life or body. Indeed, Butler emphasizes that “the problem is not merely how to
include more people within existing norms, but to consider how existing norms allocate
recognition differentially” (Butler 6). Butler’s intention is therefore not to widen the pre-existing
parameters of normativity or prescriptions of a body but rather to reconsider them entirely.
According to these standards, something may very well be living, but it does not imply its
recognition as a life. Such determinations are reserved only for those things within the scope of
normativity, or those lives worthy of being grievable. The loose and indeterminable definitions
of what might be deemed a life and furthermore, a grievable life, suggests an inequity between
those establishing the parameters for its definition and those most affected by it.
While perhaps defined somewhat differently across social spheres and location, these
norms are often established through means of force by political and social groups in power—
governments, celebrities, or status. These norms “produce and shift the terms through which
subjects are recognized,” creating a dynamic scale of parameters to judge their very subjectivity
(Butler 3-4). The recognition of one’s subjectivity is thereby determined by their intelligibility,
again resulting from the prescription of normative frames. Butler distinguishes “apprehension” a
more apt term when discussing subjectivity, in that its lack of precision provides a way of
“marking, registering, acknowledging without full cognition,” what is being evaluated (5).
Framing allows the norms established by authority or power to determine the recognizability of a
life and to apprehend it as such. In doing so, these frames also establish what Butler terms as the
“precarity” of an individual or group.
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Precarity is a social determination of one’s existence as a vulnerable being, subject to
outside forces that render us “injurable” or “in some sense in the hands of the other. … [I]t
implies being impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, most of whom remain
anonymous” (Butler 14). Precariousness is therefore determined by the very preconditions upon
which it is built; it is a “politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from
failing social and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury,
violence, and death” (25). Groups or individuals experiencing precarity live in compromised
conditions, in which their perceived value is less than that of others, exposing them to threats of
violence, injury, or destruction simply because they are not within the parameters of established
normativity. The parameters established do not exist isolated to the imposer, but they also project
harmful implications upon the entirety of the system in which they exist. As such, these
parameters reveal precarity to be the temporality and fragility of life, highlighting two important
defining factors: that lives are not solely independent from those of others, but rather the
opposite—they are contingent upon the decisions and actions of other individuals between which
there may be little interaction, and second, that sustaining life can only be possible through a
mitigation of the inequity of precarity.
Indeed, this notion of precarity informs social definitions of life and identity. Butler
raises concerns that while identity is frequently understood as an individual determination,
precarity imposes external definitions of identity upon the individual. Precarity both inflicts and
exposes the repercussions of societal interdependencies, and the way individual actions affect
others. Butler examines this difficult conception through questioning their own social
responsibilities: “am I responsible only to myself? Are there others for whom I am responsible?
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And how do I, in general, determine the scope of my responsibility?” (Butler 35). Butler
continues, further questioning their individuality as part of a more interconnected network:
I confess to having some problems with the pronouns in question. Is it only as an "I," that
is, as an individual, that I am responsible? Could it be that when I assume responsibility
what becomes clear is that who "I" am is bound up with others in necessary ways? Am I
even thinkable without that world of others? In effect, could it be that through the process
of assuming responsibility the "I" shows itself to be, at least partially, a "we"?
Butler’s arrival at the “we” from an analysis of the “I” delineates the network of connection
between the individual and another. Though this recognition of the self and other implies the
distinction between the two, it also suggests an inherent connection between them as well. 3 The
self cannot exist in isolation.
In the same way that Butler’s evaluation of the self rejects the possibility for an isolated
existence, so too does Berry. Although suggested through Butler’s development of this social
interdependence between both living and non-living subjects, Berry more directly applies it to
the consideration of the body and its network of relations to other people, as well as to the
entirety of creation around them. He determines that no human can exist entirely independent
from another, and the very suggestion of their separation is the ultimate fallacy and “mythical
condition” perpetuated by current societal standards of identity (Berry, Unsettling 111). He
asserts that there is “no such thing as autonomy,” but rather “there is only a distinction between

Butler’s dissertation and first book, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France, more
fully addresses Hegel’s notion of the subject as formulated in Phenomenology of Spirit. Butler’s discussion of an
“other” in Frames of War implies a Hegelian interpretation of precarity; the parameters imposed by those in
authority discount the “other” from truly being considered a life. They fail to recognize an “other” as a subject, and
therefore fail to fully recognize themselves, lacking a self-conscious acknowledgment of their own identity (Hegel
Phenomenology). In doing so, they compromise their self-consciousness by forsaking others’ subjectivity, denying
themselves of responsibility to a “we” or anyone beyond themselves, as Butler does above. However, both Hegel
and Butler assert that interactive recognition between the self and “other” is required of self-consciousness because
the self, and its continuation and existence are entirely dependent upon the existence and awareness of the “other.”
3
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responsible and irresponsible dependence” (111). Much like Butler, who writes “there is no life
without the conditions of life that variably sustain life, …involving reproducible and sustaining
social relations, and relations to the environment,” Berry suggests that individuals and insularity
beget irresponsibility (Butler 19). Autonomy, or the belief that one can be autonomous, negates
the responsibility individuals have to the individuals to whom they are connected, the Hegelian
“other” that Butler describes. In better understanding the self and its identity, one can more fully
recognize the “other” through their own self-consciousness, just as Butler exemplifies through
their questions above. The “I” does not exist without the “we,” and therefore establishes an
inherent connection between the two. Berry and Butler both fundamentally agree that the body
and its persistence is significantly dependent upon its relations to other bodies. Berry clearly
advances this idea with its reflexive relationship to the earth and provides an ecocritical lens with
which to view Butler.

Precarity: Valuation and Violence
Frames constructed by social significance to produce such hierarchical norms determine
the level of precarity to which bodies become subject, and therefore also determine the varying
degrees of potential threats of violence. Butler claims, “the normative production of ontology
thus produces the epistemological problem of apprehending a life, and this in turn gives rise to
the ethical problem of what it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard against injury and violence”
(3). When the very definition of life does not have a universal frame within which it fits, the
protection of a life becomes difficult, as its subjectivity remains under constant debate. Again,
the result is an “othering,” of anything beyond the bounds of the established normative
framework. At a human level, the relational othering of a body suggests a contempt for it by
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distinguishing its separation from a collective we. By exhibiting disregard for other bodies, “we
begin to find it easier than ever to prefer our own bodies” and “abuse, exploit, and otherwise
hold in contempt those other bodies for the greater good or comfort of our own” (Berry,
Unsettling 108). Here, Berry and Butler meet in their mutual dissatisfaction with the dualistic
socio-political framing of a body, suggesting that duality is not only problematic for human selfconception but also for our perception of other individuals and our relation to them. In
selfishness, the individual further isolates themselves from others, exacerbating the frameworks
of relational hierarchy and contempt for other bodies, and increasing the potential for violence.
By rendering others as deserving of disdain, there is little identifiable value of their life
independent of their monetary worth or capital contribution, reinforcing the need for a
reformation of the social framing of an individual within the capitalist framework. Until the
individual’s value extends beyond a capitalistic system, they are limited in their participation in a
system built upon social and environmental conviviality and interdependence.
The valuation of the body largely provides the basis for which Berry and Butler’s
perspectives meet. Butler renders the body precarious due to its fraught social definition and
framing, a concept not explicitly stated within Berry’s determination of the body, but certainly
implied. Berry’s discussion of imbalance between the valuation of the elements he believes
comprise the body implies its precarity, as the definition of precarity is not only the state of being
subjected to the will or decision of others, but also one of uncertainty and insecurity (OED).
Berry claims that this hierarchical ranking of different bodies, or even individual elements of
bodies further exacerbates the identity of the body as imbalanced and therefore, precarious. As
Berry suggests, the valuation of these bodies innately places individuals in competition with one
another, in which one will always be superior to the other, therefore producing an inequality
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between the two. Such inequalities are what render the body, or certain bodies, precarious, and
more importantly determine which bodies are more precarious than others. Butler notes that
“lives are by definition precarious: they can be expunged at will or by accident,” but that
“precarity designates that…condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and
economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death”
(Butler 25). In consistently comparing other bodies to one’s own, the body misrepresents itself in
importance, deepening the divide between the soul and the body, as well as between itself and
“all else,” or the groups and communities to which it belongs. In doing so, “we condemn
ourselves to a loneliness for which the only compensation is violence—against other creatures,
against the earth, against ourselves” (Berry, Unsettling 110). Berry argues that this separation,
this imbalance of the components of the body, or the body from other bodies, makes violence
more permissive and accessible. The constant comparison between one’s own body, or the self,
and the “other” reinforces the hierarchical valuation of bodies, by removing signs of mutuality or
similarity and instead highlighting their differences. By doing so, it allows for the denigration of
others within that artificial structure of ranking through differentiation of what one lacks.
The enaction of violence of any form against another individual reflects an incongruent
valuation of bodies in a society. The inequity imposed by violence indicates a society
disassociated with a concern for establishing a harmonious relationship between body and spirit
on an individual level but also amongst the members of its community. Butler reflects on the
distinct violence of warfare, where both sides enact physical violence upon one another, while
also dehumanizing their aggressors and rendering the other side inhuman. However, Butler
introduces an irony here, that “they are themselves living populations with whom cohabitation
presupposes a certain interdependency among us,” and it is this very treatment of
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interdependency that “has concrete implications for who survives, who thrives, who barely
makes it, and who is eliminated or left to die” (43). Violence not only disrupts the lives upon
those whom it is enacted but threatens the very systems of which they are a part—be it their own
or their aggressors.
Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor engages a similar
perspective in which he describes the effects of less volatile and recognizable instances of
violence. Rather than focusing on the more macrocosmic violence that frequently occupies much
of our societal and media attention, Nixon draws attention to damage of a more gradual and less
grand scale. These instances of violence may eventually yield a similar result or level of
destruction, but because of their lack of immediacy, often acquire very little attention or
resolution. Though he does not use the term exclusively, Berry describes the deteriorating
agricultural landscape of the 1970s as its own form of slow violence; the growing economy of
the “agridollar” left many smaller farmers out of business, while the scale of farming moved
towards high yield and “full production” farms dependent upon heavy machinery and monocrops
(Berry, Unsettling 107). While some individuals will see degradation “without knowing what it
means,” others “will see it, and know what it means, and not care,” which will result in a slow
violence to agricultural land and farmers for whom we have “less and less use” (107). This
apathy towards slow violence inevitably yields inaction. To a capitalist-driven society, incentives
to correct its dysfunction run extremely low, and therefore often directly impact groups already
disenfranchised or disadvantaged by this economic structure. Thus, the poor, subjected to
increasing levels of slow, unaddressed violence suffer from escalating precarity. Poor is a
“compendious category subject to almost infinite local variation,” suggesting that depending
upon the way it is framed, be it by divisions of “ethnicity, gender, race, class, religion,” etc., it
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will always represent a group subjected to mistreatment and violence (Nixon 7). Society does not
prioritize slow violence, as Nixon makes clear through several anecdotes throughout his book,
nor does it often find ways to mitigate the effects of violence on the poor. Instead, Nixon further
emphasizes Butler’s point in an environmental context. He suggests that the lagging, yet
detrimental, violence that takes place over time against vulnerable groups produces
disproportionate effects. Such effects, to borrow from Butler, might best be referred to as
precarity. These effects, often diminished by larger groups with more political or financial
power, “engage the culturally variable issue of who counts as a witness” (16). Indeed, such a
question employs Butlerian notions of framing; when the frames society employs to define
personhood or a body worth protecting exclude a certain group of people, it muddies the
theoretical waters of attempted resolution of the issues caused by precarity. The delegitimizing of
and refusal to recognize these individuals as individuals leads to a perpetual cycle of precarity as
they are unable to relieve their own suffering or “poor-ness.” Nixon’s concept of slow violence
contextualizes precarity, exposing it for the inevitable threats it imposes upon everyone, but
especially those most vulnerable and susceptible to violence and instability. It further elucidates
the rendering of the body as precarious and presents a notable case for returning to the
ontological resolutions of restorative health of the body presented by Berry within “The Body
and the Earth.”
Berry distinguishes that life in all forms and the actions taken for and against it greatly
influence the ultimate understanding of earth as a life, body, and spirit. Butler’s discussion of life
and bodies provides additional material conceptions beyond those of Berry’s spiritual examples
to adequately support his admonition of their better treatment. Furthermore, Butler provides
supplementary definitions of personhood and precarity to Berry’s notion of “spirit,” expanding
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the influences of his assertions to everyone, not just those individuals concerned with the
Christian tradition. In the same mode that Berry suggests the separation between the materiality
of the body and the religious notion of the spirit is to blame for a tainted perspective of earth’s
value and significance, Butler’s understanding of the body cannot be singularly accepted as well.
Butler’s definition of the body and its focus on materialism lacks a fundamental element of
spiritual personhood that Berry offers. While Butler’s views contextualize Berry in contemporary
ecocriticism, Berry provides greater balance and ultimate resolution to the separation of the
material and immaterial elements of the body. Berry’s essay acknowledges the religious and
biological connections of the earth, implying an opportunity for greater intersectionality of the
same notions through a contemporized interpretation of the body.

Commodification, Health, and “Cures”
If Berry’s notion of identity rests on the combination of both the body and spirit as one,
then a loss or imbalance of either would therefore result in a deprivation of identity. These
incessant disruptions to human identity produce misconstrued notions of health and valuation of
our bodies. Such notions establish a problematic hierarchy, as they lead to the desensitization of
the subjectivity of ourselves, others, and all living things. As previously noted, Cartesian dualism
referred to the body simply as a mechanism controlled by the mind, one in which all activities of
the body were “purely mental operations” (Garrard 25). Such objectification of the body
established a precedent for low valuation of the body, both for humans and animals, establishing
that “bodies without minds” were “effectively machines” (25). Indeed, dualism tainted
perceptions of the human body, establishing this problematic objectivity as a mainstay in
contemporary culture, representing “the beginnings of the modern ‘self,’ detached from its body
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and from nature” (Collier 141). This detachment between the body—or self—and nature
encapsulates Berry’s primary concern within his essay of the loss of holistic identity and a
healthy relationship with the earth. Indeed, as American ecologist and cellular biologist Barry
Commoner explained, “all of modern technology leads us to believe that we have made our own
environment and no longer depend on the one provided by nature. We have become enticed into
a nearly fatal illusion: that through our machines we have at last escaped from dependence on the
natural environment” (Tully 184). Once again, Commoner clearly expresses the problematic and
persistent objectification of the body introduced hundreds of years ago as well as a critical
exposition and argument for its mitigation reflected within Berry’s writing. While removing the
use of any technology in a modern era is an unrealistic standard, its use should not disrupt the
relationship between the body and the earth. An overemphasis of technology, the lack of use of
the body, and the growing distance between the two provides an illusion that the body is not
dependent upon the earth for its survival. The objectification of the body as a machine, but also
inversely, the body’s dependence on machines, results in greater division between the earth and
the individual, as it either elevates or denigrates its status to that of an object. Therefore, the
objectification of the body is the mutual objectification of the earth.
This divisive objectification necessitates the establishment of better relations and security
of the body, a notion Berry suggests will inevitably provide the foundation for repairing the
relationship between spirit—or mind—and body, and ultimately the earth. However, doing so
requires a recognition of the factors driving such division. The dualistic objectification of the
body popularized by Descartes and rapid development of technology ultimately found its way
into the industrialized economy, one based on the ability to produce quickly to yield maximum
financial gain. Industrialization diminished the traditional means of manual production and
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rewarded convenience and efficiency. In doing so, it simultaneously positioned the body as a
machine, making permissible its exploitative use for labor. If we think of the body simply as a
non-cognitive entity in a world where only rational thought is valued, then it can be utilized as a
means to an end—a commodity—rather than a means in itself. According to anthropologist
Lesley Sharp, commodification “insists upon objectification in some form, transforming persons
and their bodies from a human category into objects of economic desire” (Sharp 293). Thus, the
value of the body became its exchange value, or the value it could offer a capitalist economy in
exchange for its ability to conduct production. The body was a commodity just like any other
object, and its value was therefore determined by its ability to produce. However, it is also
important to remember that, as Sharp suggests, commodities are “not simply things-in-and-ofthemselves, or objects whose worth lies merely in their exchange value,” but are rather
“frequently entangled in a host of meanings framed by sociopolitical concerns, and thus they are
symbolically charged by their sociality as well as by their links to hierarchy and power” (291).
The complexity of defining a material body supports Butler’s assertion that its valuation is not
isolated to itself, but rather hinges on its sociopolitical framing. The body, even as a commodity,
cannot exist entirely separate from other bodies, suggesting its participation in a larger network
beyond itself.
The commodification of the body threatens its position as a part of these larger social,
political, and biological systems through their rejection by definition and valuation. By excluding
only certain bodies, the narrow societal frames prevent them from fully participating within the
system, ultimately widening the fissure between the body and the earth as a byproduct of their
ongoing separation. This continued disconnection, exacerbated by established socio-political
frames of normativity ultimately yields further inequity and commodification. Such
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commodification takes place in various forms, each with their own detrimental effects on bodily
and earthly health. The literal separation of the body into its constitutive parts is one such
method of commodification that threatens this relationship and contributes to the precarity of the
body. Berry explains this problematic approach by anecdotally describing an experience from a
high school biology course, in which his textbook individually monetized the independent organs
of the body based on their market value. By reducing the body or its issues to just one area or
part, we incidentally prescribe value to its singular function. Should one of these parts fail,
however, what then? The body’s value — or lack thereof — eventually translates to one of
economic worth, and as a “‘commodity’ that can be bartered, sold or stolen in divisible and
alienable parts” (Scheper-Hughes 6). These monetary prescriptions establish yet another
hierarchical ranking of the body, in which those whose bodies are lower in perceived value are
deemed lesser beings. Because these individuals do not meet these standards of wealth, beauty,
status, intelligence, health, or other normative forms, they are often deemed as “other,” and are
therefore rejected and isolated. It is this isolation Butler and Berry seek to reform by
reconnecting the body within its various frameworks to once again make the body whole.
Further isolation of the body occurs through the misunderstanding of health. Berry
describes general attitudes towards health as “preventing disease (mainly by destroying germs)”
or the absence of disease (Unsettling 103). The medical world dispassionately disregards the
“whole,” or the entirety of the body, through its specialized focus. Therefore, health becomes
synonymous with fixing or “curing” only those portions of the body that are diseased or ill.
Instead of providing restorative measures of health, society continually monetizes and
commoditizes cures. If the body can be measured and valued for its constituent parts, so too can
the attempts to mitigate its ailments. Modern medicine seeks to resolve disease or alleviate pain,
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but it often does so at high cost — both physically and financially — to the user. For those with
life-threatening diseases or pain, medicine can be their only source of relief, however, the use of
drugs also imposes a myriad of hierarchies upon their users through established societal norms.
Drug use is often stigmatized in the way it is moralized by society; individuals with good health
may believe that the diminished health of others is simply a result of lack of care or poor
decisions. What they fail to realize are the “social determinants of health,” or those
environmental and circumstantial instances external to their own decisions, that can “tip the
scales against people” (Grinspoon). Jean Baudrillard so aptly captured the discrepancies of
health, asserting that “health today is not so much a biological imperative linked to survival as a
social imperative linked to status. It is not so much a basic ‘value’ as a form of prestige display”
(Baudrillard 139). By moralizing the use of drugs and medication, society associates such use
with lower-class, disadvantaged individuals, deeming health an indicator of someone’s status and
social standing. Such a perspective would also believe that those dependent upon medicine must
not be able to maintain health and are therefore reliant on others for their own survival. This
perception privileges insular independence, making it synonymous with health and suggesting
that health is simply “the absence of disease” (Berry, Unsettling 102-103). Indeed, focusing on
absence, or the lack of perceived health issues indicates a fundamental disconnection with the
body. This definition of health connotes a “lack of bodily awareness, as a ‘silence of the organs’”
as Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco have so thoughtfully described (20). The figurative
silencing of organs is a hierarchical imposition aimed to retain mental fortitude regardless of any
indication by the body otherwise, and just as other hierarchical relationships establish inequity
through dominance of one trait over another, it prioritizes the position of power. Poor health is
thus a moniker for both physical deficiencies and weak mental capacity. Butler would determine
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this construction of hierarchical structure upon systems of health results in greater fissures
between the self and the body. Simultaneously, these hierarchies increase precarity by forcefully
positioning some individuals beyond the normative frames of health.
Therefore, these definitions of health do not adequately represent a viable cure for the
reparation of the body as a whole entity, but rather further disrupt it. Berry’s suggestion for a
holistic reunification of the mind and spirit re-grounds Christian tradition in the world, providing
significance and holiness to this earth instead of simply “living for the next world” through a
“conceptual division between the holy and the world” (“Secular” 403). By re-centering the
conversation of health around the ethical treatment of the body, he proposes its significance as a
life, rather than forsaking it as merely temporal.
Berry argues that the only method for this reconciliation of mind and spirit is through a
process of healing in which both bodily and earthly health are redefined. The very notion of
healing implies the existence of a deficiency, and therefore suggests health as representative of
one being “whole.” Therefore, wholeness becomes synonymous with health for Berry. As he has
done throughout the entirety of his essay, he emphasizes spiritual, or mental health, as well as
physical health, proposing that the well-being of both ultimately provides a sense of wholeness
and a comprehensive description of health. He says, “health is rooted in the concept of
wholeness. To be healthy is to be whole” (Berry, Unsettling 107). Alternative conceptions of
health propound that the body and soul contradict one another; however, this creates an
imbalance between the body and spirit, making it “extremely difficult to set a proper value on the
life of the body in this world – to believe it is good, howbeit short and imperfect” (108). If health
is wrought by bringing the soul and body together through mutual respect for one another, then
“conviviality is healing” (108). Berry suggests this joy in togetherness extends not only to fellow

40

humans but also through reconciliation with all the constituents of creation. Or perhaps, a wider
invitation might be extended to reconnect with all forms of life upon which we mutually depend.
Just like a clock will not function if one of its cogs is damaged or malfunctioning, the body
cannot function properly should one or more of its elements, either physical or mental, fail to
work. However, because of this, the approach to bodily health reinforces the segmentation of the
body through the isolation of the affected area. While this can be extremely beneficial in healing
distinct medical ailments, it often decontextualizes the health of other areas, discounts connective
elements, and limits the scope of causation within the body. The health of the body should be a
holistic concern, one in which the body is not fragmented to find a cure. By not resolving health
from its foundational cause, immediate “cures” are simply temporary bandages.
These temporary cures produce misaligned perceptions of health of the body or the spirit.
However, the body and spirit cannot experience health independent from one another. If the body
is compromised, so too is its spirit, as “it is wrong to think that bodily health is compatible with
spiritual confusion or cultural disorder, or with polluted air and water” (Berry, Unsettling 107).
Here, Berry sets an even greater precedent for health, that it is also a matter of collective
concern. Personal health concerns become public health issues when individuals disregard how
their personal decisions inflict others with the consequences of their actions. For example, air
pollution, an issue heavily contributed to by the emissions of personal vehicles, home utilities,
and industrial production becomes a communal problem created by a collection of individuals.
These emissions can exacerbate asthma, increase instances of bronchitis, and even prevent
schools from allowing children to go to recess, imposing taxing consequences for the
community. These social and biological connections that bind individuals together suggest that
there are also weighty repercussions to this network should individuals disregard their health.
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Such lack of care for one’s health results in greater strain on their community to compensate on
their behalf. Likewise, in an active ecological system, a disproportionately dysfunctional member
could cause a systemic imbalance, leading to an inevitable collapse if left unaddressed. Berry,
like Butler, exposes the social implications of health left untreated, or worse, threatened by
others. In doing so, Berry implies that wholeness is not simply a necessity for spiritual salvation
but is deeply embedded in the temporal experience as well. Wholeness appeals to the secular
through its inclusion of the body, but also provides significance to the body by necessitating its
companionship to the cognizant spirit, which is responsible for its welfare.
The breakdown of health and the antithesis of wholeness is, therefore, the segregation of
the body and the spirit; their disunion fuels objectification as we exploit the body’s appearance
through our “representation of the body as capital and as fetish” (Baudrillard 277). We
frequently mistake the ideal aesthetic beauty of a body as representative of health, fetishizing it
as a pillar of fitness. However, the outward, physical specimen is not always an accurate
indication of one’s health. By fetishizing a fraction of the body—the external—we negate its
wholeness, ascribing its aesthetic appearance to be a signifier of its health (279). When society
appreciates a body only for its physical features, it does not consider internal health, resulting in
yet another dualistic division between the body and spirit.
The preoccupation with physical aesthetics designates only certain portions of the body
as significant, creating and reinforcing the artificial hierarchy of value set forth by societal
standards and norms. Berry alludes to this idea with his claim that the standard of health has been
replaced “by very exclusive physical models. The concept of ‘model’ here conforms very closely
to the model of the scientists and planners: it is an exclusive, narrowly defined ideal which
affects destructively whatever it does not include” (Berry, Unsettling 116). Comparison to the
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“model,” or the archetype to which individuals are encouraged by society to compare
themselves, often results in dissatisfaction with oneself, ushering in discontentment with their
perceived worth. Those for whom the “ideal” is not present nor possible diminish themselves
based upon the notion of what they believe they “ought to be” (112). Berry’s description of
society’s models highlights its function as a frame, defining the body, its health, and its value
solely by these narrowly prescribed parameters. Falling outside these bounds excludes an
individual from legitimacy or recognition by society, as Butler might describe, rendering them
vulnerable to discrimination and even violence. Therefore, health is jeopardized, as they cannot
be made whole through their perpetual isolation from society and its standards.
Berry explains that societal measures of “ideal” health do not consider the relationship
between or safety of the body and spirit, but rather how closely they align with the tenets of
beauty. In such modalities, the concern of health is therefore not wholeness, but an appearance of
health based on the aesthetic parameters we have prescribed to it. Those whose features are not
accepted or do not adhere to these statutes reside in a constant state of precarity in which the
“crisis of the body brings a helpless dependence on cures” (Berry, Unsettling 117). However,
these “cures” are not an attempt at healing but rather popular methods of attaining the impossible
standards by any means necessary (e.g., plastic surgery, personal training, disordered eating,
debt, beauty products, etc.). Berry’s insight into this aspect of commoditization and health eerily
anticipated the prominence of this issue today—due to the internet and social media—as well as
preemptively highlights the scenarios of precarity these perspectives introduce for individuals
external to the boundaries established by the norms Butler highlights.
Despite the growing disruptions to the health and wholeness of the body, the methods by
which society suggests to “cure” them is not the work Berry recommends, but rather to “find
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yourself” through greater autonomy, further amplifying the issue (Unsettling 115). The cure does
not seek to reconnect the individual with its community, but instead focuses on the individual—
promising autonomous “health” through its method of self-prescribing independence. Thus,
contemporary “cures” purport autonomy, increase precarity, and exacerbate isolation, further
removing them from the very connections on which they depend for sustained health. These
connections can be communal or individual, in that the spirit disconnected from the body results
in precarity of the body itself. A disconnection from the community, either by choice or force,
may prevent an individual from participating in its larger social or even biological community,
siphoning off access to the fundamental needs—proper food, sociality, support—for their
ultimate survival. Baudrillard clarifies Berry’s assertions, expounding upon the same issue that
“what is interesting is the suggestion that one should revert back into one’s own body and invest
it narcissistically ‘from the inside’, not in any sense to get to know it in depth, but by a wholly
fetishistic and spectacular logic, to form it into a…more functional object for the outside world”
(Baudrillard 278). Baudrillard highlights the problematic autonomy with which Berry takes
issue, exposing its tendency to allow for commodification and fetishization of the body through a
self-obsessed focus on its cure. The result is not one of health. Instead, they further their own
objectification and commodification of the body in the same way they have commoditized the
very bodies they seek to emulate through their fetishization of them. By highlighting this
problematic and fetishized misconception of health, Berry underscores the importance of healing
both the body and spirit together, rather than through the predominantly physical methods
society advances instead. Without the spirit, the secular body lacks sufficient means for
counteracting the forces imposed by normative physical aesthetics.
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Berry uses this element of bodily health to exemplify the similar practices of
commodification of the earth through our fetishization of the “models” of wilderness as pristine
and untouched landscape. Berry claims that we did this when “we began to romanticize the
wilderness — which is to say we began to institutionalize it within the concept of the ‘scenic’”
(Berry 104). In the same way that the body became an object for “looking,” so too has our
wilderness been a place for “viewing,” forgetting that wilderness exists even amidst
civilization’s alteration of it. Within this framework, land is a commodity, one of “abstract space
that was measured and then sold” in the same way people, “like Africans and Asians, became
commodities for exchange” (Mrozowski 155). By abstracting wilderness specifically as
something “other” from the land we occupy or develop, we commoditize it like we do the
aesthetic body by objectifying its purpose as one of instrument, rather than subject. In this mode
of objectification, we are “instrumentalizing rather the fragmented parts of the body in a giant
process of sublimation, of denying the body its very evocation” (Baudrillard 280). Essentially,
pristine wilderness is romanticized and exalted to the point of fragmentation from its whole,
misrepresented as the healthiest form of the earth, while anything outside it is not. Reminiscent
of Butler’s normative frames, the areas both within and outside these bounds represent different
means of commoditization. The very use of the term “wilderness” implies a separation through
its uncivilized, unorganized existence, allowing for its objectification through “looking” and
“viewing,” but also in our interest to see that which is wild juxtaposed to the tameness of
civilization. Likewise, the non-wilderness portions of the earth are also commoditized, though,
not for their fetishized aesthetics, but through their repeated purchase, sale, and constant
modification. The separation of the two—wilderness and civilization—functions much the same
as the separation of the body and the spirit: ripping apart that which makes them whole,
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damaging their health, and capitalizing on them through their widening schism. Only through
their mutuality and reparation can they ever be considered whole. Berry asserts that the only way
to recognize this healing is to reduce the dualistic commodification of them by borrowing the
perspective of historic Chinese landscape paintings, in which the depiction of these wild
landscapes also includes humans. By dehumanizing nature, we impose limits on what wilderness
ought to be, in the same way we assert what the identity of a body or life should be. In contrast,
to depict nature with human presence implies a harmonious relationship between the two, despite
their differences and challenges. In representing them in this way, their health no longer becomes
the absence of ailments, but an inclusion of all the elements that make them functionally whole.
Through his assertion of the sacred wholeness of the body, Berry exhibits the issues they
present to the body as both a participant in Creation and a secular entity. The body’s wholeness
is both a concern of the temporal, as well as the spiritual, enlivening the relevance he has to the
secular claims regarding the biological and social health of the body. Berry’s discussion of the
body’s health and its implications for communities bolsters Butler’s determinations that violence
and mistreatment intensify bodily and communal precarity. Health serves as a critically unifying
factor in creating sustainable connections between the immaterial and material, the religious and
secular, the body and the earth.

Healing: Reunification, Conviviality, and the Land Ethic
The harmonious relationship between humans and earth makes the earthly body whole;
the segmentation of the earth as commoditized parts does not foster its health, but rather the sum
of its elements—flora and fauna—functioning together determines its wholeness. Berry’s essay
contributes thoughtful criticism of the commoditization, industrialization, and
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instrumentalization of the body, anticipating the implications this growing issue presents for the
earth—even well beyond the era of its original publication. Though heavily influenced by his
Christian belief in theological Creation, his experience as a farmer also informed his
understanding of the connection between body and earth, intimating the following:
The body is damaged by the bewilderment of the spirit, and it conducts the influence of
that bewilderment into the earth, the earth conducts it into the community, and so on. If a
farmer fails to understand what health is, his farm becomes unhealthy; it produces
unhealthy food, which damages the health of the community. But this is a network, a
spherical network, by which each part is connected to every other part. (Berry, Unsettling
114)
He recognizes not just a spiritual or Christian theological connection between individuals, but
also a biological one in which humans are dependent upon the earth, and their destruction of it
negatively impacts them. In damaging the earth, they damage the very resource upon which their
lives depend. Our dependency upon the extant systems and beings of the earth reinforces the
notion of Butler’s precarity—that an obligation to preserve life emerges from that “fact that we
are … dependent on what is outside ourselves, on others, on institutions, and on sustained and
sustainable environments, and so are, in this sense, precarious” (Butler 23). Thus, our goal
should be towards preserving “the conditions that make life possible,” because there “can be no
sustained life without those sustaining conditions” (23). In an ideal execution of the healing of
body and earth, the objectification of certain bodies, or the imposition of the parameters that
establish precarity would cease, therefore restoring all life to its place within the social and
biological network to which it contributes and upon which it depends. In such a process of
healing, the earth would become whole, and every life would then matter because of its

47

necessary part within that whole. Unfortunately, the economy’s “aim is to separate us as far as
possible from the sources of life (material, social, and spiritual),” however, our hope lies in
“restoring the broken connections” in order to be healed, because “connection is health” (Berry,
Unsettling 143). To be a body means an existence contingent upon the earth and its resources. In
restoring the connection to the earth, the body finds rehabilitated health, and restitution with its
community. While this may appear simplistic in nature, it is not simplistic in execution, as it
would require completely reframing our notions of economic value and the means by which we
obtain it, no longer capitalizing on the exploitation of precarious bodies, but instead reinstating
the balance between all aspects of life and spirit.
These separations of body/spirit and body/earth indicate larger issues within their social
and political functions as well. Arjun Appadurai clarifies this through his discussion of
commodities and what he refers to as their accompanying “knowledge” (45). He asserts that
commodities are not singularly defined by their market value but also by their methods of
production and consumption. The production knowledge of a commodity can be dramatically
different from consumption knowledge, especially as the distance between the two increasingly
grows apart. Indeed, “the two diverge proportionately as the social, spatial, and temporal
distance between producers and consumers increase” (Appadurai 45). In essence, “as
commodities travel greater distances (institutional, spatial, temporal), knowledge about them
tends to become partial, contradictory, and differentiated,” which he then claims leads to
increased demand (59). This directly contradicts some criticism of Berry, like Heise’s, which
upholds globalism as the new standard with which to instill environmental engagement. While
globalization leads to the perception of a smaller, more connected world, it increases the avenues
of capitalist production and consumption, making available commodities that were previously
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out of reach, however, it conversely results in a greater separation between the source of
production and its consumer. Berry expresses his acute awareness of this situation, claiming that
our economy’s “aim is to separate us as far as possible from the sources of life (material, social,
and spiritual), to put these sources under the control of corporations and specialized
professionals, and to sell them at highest profit” (Unsettling 138). Current perceptions suggest
the need for individuals to know where their food, clothing, and material goods come from is not
important so long as it continues to come. However, this rapid economic growth comes at the
expense of human and earthly health in that “we lose our health—and create profitable diseases
and dependences—by failing to see direct connections between living and eating, eating and
working, working and loving” (138). While Heise touts Berry’s “sense of place” as oldfashioned and narrow, his emphasis on local framework is not without legitimacy. The
globalized supply chain removes the individual’s awareness of its source, introducing a chasm
between production and consumption where responsibility for their effects is rarely considered.
Rampant consumption, and therefore exploitation of resources to produce these goods continues
to grow.
Although Berry and his writings are perhaps not devoid of controversy, the relevance of
his assertions in “The Body and the Earth” should not go unrecognized within environmental
discourse today. Perhaps Berry’s most critical contribution within his work is the resolution of
health that he offers through a reparation of body and soul, individual and community. Utilizing
a term borrowed from Aldo Leopold, Berry establishes his own form of a land ethic. Leopold
postulates that “a land ethic transforms the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the landcommunity to plain member and citizen of it” (173). He introduces this concept in The Sand
County Almanac, stating that “all ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the
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individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts” (172). While the individual may
“compete for his place in that community,” he is also bound by the community, as his “ethics
prompt him also to co-operate” (172). Leopold suggests, much like Berry, that the individual is
not an entirely independent entity, but one that functions as a consequential member of a
community whose interactions with it contribute to its function and determine its outcome. While
the individual can, as Leopold suggests, position themselves to benefit from the community, their
actions also result in its persistence or detriment. The notion of a land ethic reconsiders such an
idea to include the human, biological, geological, and environmental elements of the earth. By
positioning his beliefs in this way, Berry is, as Butler might describe, redefining the frames, or
“breaking out” of the “confinement” they establish (Butler 11). Butler describes that while
frames can be limiting, they also produce the context with which we view everything outside
them as well. By “framing” an idea in a certain way, the surrounding narrative changes
depending on that frame, as it “does not quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every
time it seeks to give definitive organization to its content” (10). Berry’s land ethic reframes the
necessity of earthly care, simultaneously reframing the pre-existing surrounding narrative as
well. His land ethic applies a broader, more compassionate approach to communal interaction
with and utilization of land and resources. Instead of viewing resources as accessible
commodities ripe for exploitation and overuse, it accounts for their subjectivity, the subjectivity
of those who depend upon them, and the implications of treating them as such. Furthermore, this
land ethic also identifies some of the shortcomings and problematic imbalances imposed by a
capitalist economy.
While the evaluation and suggestion for a viable alternative to capitalism lie beyond the
scope of my argument here, it is necessary to acknowledge the difficulties capitalism presents in
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establishing more equitable treatment of the earth. As previously noted, capitalism fuels
inequality and hierarchical behavior established by wealth, therefore exacerbating precarity. It
separates individuals and groups of individuals by their material accumulation and rewards those
individuals who have succeeded in the greatest acquisition of such monetary wealth. However, if
we were to “change the political structure of society so that production to meet real needs
replaces production for the accumulation of wealth,” then it is argued that the “ecological
problem of limits produced by capital’s structural need for perpetual growth will disappear”
(Garrard 28). The unrelenting perception of “lack” of wealth would no longer plague modern
society, and as a result, a new basis of consumer culture would transform desire into satiety.
Capitalism breeds dissatisfaction through comparison on an individualized basis—removing the
ability to recognize contentment. Bombarded by endless marketing for consumer goods,
products, or services, individuals engage in a constant state of comparison with one another in
which they feel they never have “enough.” This ongoing cycle of consumerism fuels inequality
and incentivizes promotion of excess and overconsumption. This mindset and societal conduct
disadvantage a community by prioritizing the desires of the individual rather than what might be
best for the larger community. If the same funds were invested in community betterment rather
than individual self-indulgence, the land ethic would be strengthened through broader, mutual
contentment.
Capitalism establishes three extremely dangerous elements that threaten the health of an
individual and community, breed precarity, and foster discontentment, thereby jeopardizing the
potential for establishing a viable land ethic. First, capitalism prescribes value to a resource,
inexorably determining its role as a commodity. In doing so, it yields the second element: the
objectification of the resource through its function as a service or the need it fulfills. The
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resource, now defined by its use, cannot assume any value outside of that application. For
example, in believing that coal is the only viable means of heating our homes, we dichotomously
position any alternative to it at the expense of an individual’s happiness, or even their survival. If
the choice is between either heat by coal power or no heat, especially in more extreme climates,
what choice does an individual or community have other than to heat their home with coal? This
presents the third element: the unwillingness to explore or consider alternatives due to more
powerful capitalistic concerns. If coal is inexpensive, then to what benefit is the search for an
alternative? The inertia of capitalist concerns for maximum financial gain outweighs the
disruption of uncertain growth towards more earthly compassion. Why go to seemingly
unnecessary lengths to search for something that may be cleaner when these methods continue to
produce satisfactory results? Capitalism does not reward ethics but rather incentivizes monetary
efficiency, regardless of its actual longevity. The move towards a land ethic requires a
perspectival shift and individual—as well as collective—investment in consuming less on behalf
of others. It requires a more nuanced sacrifice of individual comfort and an exercising of
restraint: a complete reversal of the consumer-driven structure currently in place.
In this sense, capitalism seeks to destroy collectivism, community, and the symbiotic
interdependency that Berry asserts is the only mechanism for restoring health to both our minds
and bodies as well as between humans and the earth. Indeed, capitalism not only fuels precarity
through inequality established by social inequities but also through its divisive utilization of
consumer culture. Instead, it is critical that society implement an ethic much like Leopold’s by
reestablishing individuals as “plain members and participatory citizens” of the “commonwealth
of all forms of life on earth” with “responsibilities not only to sustain ourselves, but always to
sustain ourselves in such a way that we reciprocally cosustain all the other forms of life on which
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we are interdependent and which cosustain us” (Tully 185). By exploiting any one member of
the system, we threaten our own ability to survive within the system. James Tully perfectly
emphasizes this sentiment in his book Life Sustains Life 2: The Ways of Reengagement with the
Living Earth:
Despite the individualistic and competitive relationships of the dominant economy, we
humans are participants in multiple social systems of this symbiotic or gift-reciprocitygift kind. Relationships within families, neighborhoods, communities of practice with
fellow workers, and an array of social networks are often symbiotic. Many psychologists
argue that symbiotic relationships are the bedrock of communities and mutual well-being,
unnoticed by the dominant competitive ethos, yet necessary to hold societies together.
(189)
As humans living in a society that has little concern for the earth built into its framework of
exchange and subsistence, humans forget their embeddedness within the structure of living
organisms. In doing so, we compromise their well-being constantly, and yet their well-being is
the very foundation for our existence. For humans to truly achieve sustainability of both
humanity and the planet, “resource-management efforts must shift from reshaping nature for the
purpose of satisfying human demands to moderating human demands so that they fit within the
biophysical limits” (191). Berry’s notion of health encapsulates these assertions, that
individualistic desires and their continued prioritization above communal needs cannot produce a
healthy societal system. Eventually, a community of individuals attuned only to their own
demands forsakes what might be best for their entire community in favor of themselves. In doing
so, they selfishly deny everyone else access to equitable subsistence. Furthermore, should these
collective individual impulses amount to communal compromise of the rest of the earthly
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system, their use of resources will never be satisfied, resulting in the ultimate detrimental fate of
the earth and humanity. Again, the recognition of this and acknowledgment of its criticalness is
the first step towards reestablishing our position and proximity to the earth and our mutual
health.
For Berry, the eventual reconciliation of the individual with the earth takes place through
work and the necessary engagement with one’s surroundings it requires. However, this work, as
Heise suggests, is neither achievable nor attainable for all. Berry’s admonitions to return to
pastoral lifestyles as a viable method for restorative health and reconnection to the earth is wellintentioned, but perhaps too idealistic. Alternatively, it is his recognition of the fragmentation
that occurs between the body and the earth, and their requisite reunification that offers indelible
contributions to environmental discourse. The fracture of these relationships inevitably gave rise
to an economy built upon consumption, providing justification for exploitation of both humans
and the earth. Butler’s later work provided the framework with which to analyze the
consequences of such a system, highlighting the dangerous impositions of violence and inequity,
and their resultant precarity upon those subjected to them. Thus, Berry and Butler’s most
poignant suggestions are those exhortations to encourage healing by mitigating the violence of
exploitation and over-consumption.

Conclusion
If we more deeply consider the circuitous ecosystem as one of “gift-reciprocity-gift,”
then the balance between humans and nature maintains greater stability and equity. Reciprocity
implies that there is already an inherent connectivity through a network and that the exchanges
within benefit all participants. Robin Wall Kimmerer, writer and botanist, delineates this theory
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in her book Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge and the Teachings
of Plants. In it, she discusses the cultural traditions of her indigenous heritage and their
connective relationship to the natural world through an understanding of what she calls “mutual
flourishing,” or the law of reciprocity (Kimmerer 173). This law ensures that what is removed
from the land is done so with thanksgiving, little waste, and eventual return to ensure that the
cycle continues. Consumption and production work together as opposed to at one another’s
expense. This is, as she suggests, a practice of “mindfulness” (222). Her notion of embodied
gratitude of mindfulness and reciprocity ensures a more thoughtful approach to our acts of
consumption. In a “gift-reciprocity-gift” approach to nature, the body reconnects with the mind
before partaking in what the earth provides by offering something in return—service,
recompense, civil action, gratitude, or some other contribution. The body cannot passively
participate in consumption, but rather consciously accepts the earth’s offerings with gratitude for
them. Mindful consumption prevents what Berry suggests is “the plot of a murderous paradox:
an ‘economy’ that leads to extravagance” (Berry, Home 128). Instead, an economy of reciprocity
encompasses mutual dependence of the cyclical systems of the earth rather than treating them as
a “linear process” that “transforms the body into a consumptive machine” (Berry, Unsettling
137). This alternative economy re-fastens the body to the earth through a recognition of the earth
as the source of all life-sustaining means rather than an endless supply of goods. As Berry notes,
“our demands upon the earth are determined by our ways of living with one another; our regard
for one another is brought to light in our ways of using the earth” (131). Critical to Berry’s point
within The Unsettling of America is his evaluation of the reciprocal community in which we live.
His thesis serves as a precursor to Kimmerer’s gift economy, recognizing the necessity of
respecting harmonious reciprocity:
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It is impossible for material order to exist side by side with spiritual disorder, or vice
versa, and impossible for one to thrive long at the expense of the other; it is impossible,
ultimately, to preserve ourselves apart from our willingness to preserve other creatures, or
to respect and care for ourselves except as we respect and care for other creatures; and,
most to the point of this book, it is impossible to care for each other more or differently
than we care for the earth.
This last statement becomes obvious enough when it is considered that the earth is
what we all have in common, that it is what we are made of and what we live from, and
that we therefore cannot damage it without damaging those with whom we share it. But I
believe it goes farther and deeper than that. There is an uncanny resemblance between
our behavior toward each other and our behavior toward the earth. (Berry 123-24)
Like Kimmerer, Berry’s evaluation of reciprocity requires an acknowledgment of the spiritual
aspects of a gift economy that secular critiques of societal approaches towards environmental
ethics tend to lack. In doing so, he realigns the immaterial and material in ways contemporary
environmental discussions often fail to do through their favoring of the temporal. However, an
economy of reciprocity recognizes not just a biological and material connectivity, but also that of
the community, and the immaterial ties shared by its members. Thus, Kimmerer’s proposed
economy offers an actionable approach towards Berry’s rethinking of health; a gift economy
provides a comprehensive method for restoring the health of the individual and their relationship
with the land through their mutual beneficence.
While a gift economy will not inherently resolve all the issues of climate change and its
accompanying effects, it redirects societal attitudes towards its mitigation from warnings issued
by individuals like Berry and Butler. What is clear from their writing is that the current societal
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framing, both socio-politically and ontologically, only supports subsets of individuals through a
faulty, unsustainable system. Eventually, the instability of a system built upon the exploitation of
bodies—human and earthly—will inevitably fail, leaving a ruinous wake of destruction behind
due to the precarity it establishes. The body, the earth, and their interconnected social, political,
and ecological systems cannot continue without recognition of their mutual subjectivity and
dependence upon one another. The body cannot survive without the life-giving substance of the
earth, nor can the individual survive through exclusion from their community. These connections
require Butlerian apprehension, or the willingness to reconsider what we recognize as a life
rather than discounting that which lacks intellectual or economic value (Butler 6-7). Therefore, a
gift economy offers the necessary alternative to an exploitative and consumptive perspective,
rewarding not just that which provides monetary value, but rather a way of restoring the
connection to the earth “analogically and reciprocally” (Berry, Unsettling 131). As Berry so
aptly concludes, “the natural forces that threaten us are the same forces that preserve and renew
us,” therefore, their expiration is our expiration (130). A cultural shift in attitudes towards
gratitude and the successful subsistence of these resources ensures our health, happiness, and
future potential for persistence.
The body, humanity, and the earth itself urgently require healing. The demand for a
change to the treatment of the body came decades ago with Berry’s initial publication, and
despite seemingly losing relevance due to updated and popularized ecocritical theories, his ideas
remain true. Berry’s argument gains strength when his notions of violence towards the body and
the earth adopt an ecocritical perspective of Butler and their discussion of precarity. The framing
of his argument through this contemporary lens enriches his admonitions for the healing of the
body in the ways he draws upon both religious and secular definitions of identity. Berry’s
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arguments are not outmoded, as they examine the ethical, biological, and social implications of
violence, commodification, and exploitation of bodies—a problem still plaguing society today.
Instead, the revisitation of his ideas within “The Body and the Earth” presents a powerful path
forward towards an ecologically benevolent reframing of our ethics and introducing earthly
reciprocity to mitigate the growing dangers of environmental degradation.
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